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Abstract
We consider a class of Gaussian layered networks where a source communicates with a destination through L intermediate
relay layers with N nodes in each layer in the presence of a single eavesdropper which can overhear the transmissions of the nodes
in any one layer. The problem of maximum secrecy rate achievable with analog network coding for a unicast communication over
such layered wireless relay networks with directed links is considered. A relay node performing analog network coding scales
and forwards the signals received at its input. The key contribution of this work is a lemma that provides the globally optimal
set of scaling factors for the nodes that maximizes the end-to-end secrecy rate for a class of layered networks. We also show that
in the high-SNR regime, ANC achieves secrecy rates within a constant gap of the cutset upper bound on the secrecy capacity. To
the best of our knowledge, this work offers the first characterization of the performance of secure ANC in multi-layered networks
in the presence of an eavesdropper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication, by its inherent broadcast nature, is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate receivers within
communication range of the source. Wyner in [1], for the first time, information-theoretically addressed the problem of secure
communication in the presence of an eavesdropper and showed that secure communication is possible if the eavesdropper
channel is a degraded version of the destination channel. The rate at which information can be transferred from the source to
the intended destination while ensuring complete equivocation at the eavesdropper is termed as secrecy rate and its maximum
over all input probability distributions is defined as the secrecy capacity of channel. Later, [2] extended Wyner’s result to
Gaussian channels. These results are further extended to various models such as multi-antenna systems [3], [4], multiuser
scenarios [5], [6], fading channels [7], [8].
An interesting direction of work on secure communication in the presence of eavesdropper(s) is one in which the source
communicates with the destination via relay nodes [9]–[14]. Such work has considered various scenarios such as different
relaying schemes (amplify-and-forward and decode-and-forward), constraints on total or individual relay power consumption,
one or more eavesdroppers. However, except for a few specific scenarios, such work does not provide tight characterization
of secrecy capacity or even optimal secrecy rate achievable with the given relaying scheme. Further, all previous work only
considered secure communication scenarios where the source communicates with the legitimate destination(s) in two hops,
over so called diamond network [15].
We consider a multihop unicast communication over layered network of relays in the presence of a single eavesdropper.
The relays nodes are arranged in layers where all relays in a particular layer can communicate only with the relays in the next
layer. The relay nodes, operating under individual power constraints, amplify-and-forward the signals received at their input.
In this scenario, multiple relay nodes in each layer can cooperate to enhance the end-to-end achievable rate. Also, the signals
transmitted simultaneously by the relays add in the air, thus providing an opportunity for the relays in the second layer onward
to perform Analog Network Coding (ANC) on the received noisy sum of these signals, where each relay merely amplifies and
forwards this noisy sum [16], [17].
The eavesdropper can overhear the transmissions from the relay nodes of any of the layers depending on its location. The
objective is to maximize the rate of secure transmission from the source to the destination by choosing the optimal set of
scaling factors for the ANC-relays, irrespective of the relays that the eavesdropper listens to. However, so far, there exists
no closed-form expression or polynomial time algorithm to exactly characterize the optimal AF secrecy rate even for general
two-hop (diamond) relay networks, except for a few specific cases where eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded or scaled
version of destination channel [14] and characterizing the optimal AF secrecy rate for general layered network is an even
harder problem than general diamond network. Thus, to get some insights into the nature of the optimal solution for such
networks, we consider symmetric layered networks, where all channel gains between the nodes in two adjacent layers are
equal, thus the nomenclature of these networks as “Equal Channel Gains between Adjacent Layers (ECGAL)” networks [18].
We provide closed-form solutions for the optimal secure AF rate for such networks. We envision that these results may help
us gain insight into the nature of the optimal solution and develop techniques which may further help in construction of
low-complexity optimal schemes for general relay networks.
The eavesdropper being a passive entity, a realistic eavesdropper scenario is the one where nothing about the eavesdropper’s
channel is known, neither its existence, nor its channel state information (CSI). However, the existing work on secrecy rate
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Fig. 1: An ECGAL network with 3 relay layers between the source s and the destination t. Each layer contains two relay
nodes. The eavesdropper overhears the transmissions from the relays in layer 2.
characterization assumes one of the following: (1) the transmitter has prefect knowledge of the eavesdropper channel states,
(2) compound channel: the transmitter knows that the eavesdropper channel can take values from a finite set [19]–[21], and
(3) fading channel: the transmitter only knows distribution of the eavesdropper channel [7], [8]. In this paper, we assume that
the CSI of the eavesdropper channel is known perfectly for the following two reasons. First, this provides an upper bound
to the achievable secure ANC rate for the scenarios where we have imperfect knowledge of the eavesdropper channel. For
example, the lower (upper) bound on the compound channel problem can be computed by solving the perfect CSI problem
with the worst (best) channel gain from the corresponding finite set. Further, this also provides a benchmark to evaluate the
performance of achievability schemes in such imperfect knowledge scenarios. Second, this assumption allows us to focus on
the nature of the optimal solution and information flow, instead of on complexities arising out of imperfect channel models.
The key contribution of this work is the computation of the globally optimal set of scaling factors for the nodes that
maximizes the end-to-end secrecy rate for a class of layered networks. We also show that in the high-SNR regime, ANC
achieves secrecy rates within an explicitly computed constant gap of the cutset upper bound on the secrecy capacity. To the
best of our knowledge, this work offers the first characterization of the performance of secure ANC in multi-layered networks
in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Organization: In Section II we introduce the system model and formulate the problem of maximum secure ANC rate
achievable in the proposed system model. In section III we compute the optimal vector of scaling factors of the nodes of an
ECGAL network when eavesdropper snoops on the transmissions of the nodes in any one of the L layers. Then, in Section IV
we analyze the high-SNR behavior of the achievable secure ANC rate and show that it lies within a constant gap from
the corresponding cutset upper bound on the secrecy capacity and Section V we numerically validate these results. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a pL`2q-layer wireless network with directed links. The source s is at layer ‘0’, the destination t is at layer ‘L`1’
and the relays from the set R are arranged in L layers between them. The lth layer contains nl relay nodes,
řL
l´1 nl “ |R|.
The source s transmits message signals to the destination t via L relay layers. However, the signals transmitted by the relays
in a layer are also overheard by the eavesdropper e. An instance of such a network is given in Figure 1. Each node is assumed
to have a single antenna and operate in full-duplex mode, e.g. as in [18], [22].
At instant n, the channel output at node i, i P RY tt, eu, is
yirns “
ÿ
jPN piq
hjixjrns ` zirns, ´8 ă n ă 8, (1)
where xjrns is the channel input of node j in neighbor set N piq of node i. In (1), hji is a real number representing the
channel gain along the link from the node j to the node i and constant over time (as in [18], for example) and known (even for
the eavesdropper channels) throughout the network [10], [11]. All channel gains between the nodes in two adjacent layers are
assumed to be equal, thus the nomenclature of these networks as “Equal Channel Gains between Adjacent Layers (ECGAL)”
networks [18]. The source symbols xsrns,´8 ă n ă 8, are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance
Ps that satisfy an average source power constraint, xsrns „ N p0, Psq. Further, tzirnsu is a sequence (in n) of i.i.d. Gaussian
random variables with zirns „ N p0, σ2q. We assume that zi are independent of the input signal and of each other. We also
assume that each relay’s transmit power is constrained as:
Erx2i rnss ď P, i P R,´8 ă n ă 8 (2)
In ANC, each relay node amplifies and forwards the noisy signal sum received at its input. More precisely, relay node
i, i P R, at instant n` 1 transmits the scaled version of yirns, its input at time instant n, as follows
xirn` 1s “ βiyirns, 0 ď β2i ď β2i,max “ P {PR,i, (3)
where PR,i is the received power at node i and choice of scaling factor βi satisfies the power constraint (2).
Assuming equal delay along each path, for the network in Figure 1, the copies of the source signal (xsr.s) and noise signals
(zir.s), respectively, arrive at the destination and the eavesdropper along multiple paths of the same delay. Therefore, the signals
received at the destination and eavesdropper are free from intersymbol interference (ISI). Thus, we can omit the time indices
and use equations (1) and (3) to write the input-output channel between the source s and the destination t as
yt “
»– ÿ
pi1,...,iLqPKst
hs,i1βi1hi1,i2 ...hiL´1,iLβiLhiL,t
fiflxs ` Lÿ
l“1
nlÿ
j´1
»– ÿ
pi1,...,iL´lqPKlj,t
βljhlj,i1 ...βiL´lhiL´l,t
fifl zlj ` zt (4)
where Kst is the set of L-tuples of node indices corresponding to all paths from the source s to the destination t with path
delay L. Similarly, Klj,t is the set of L ´ l- tuples of node indices corresponding to all paths from the jth relay of the lth
layer to the destination with path delay L´ l ` 1.
We introduce modified channel gains as follows. For all the paths between the source and the destination:
hst “
ÿ
pi1,...,iLqPKs
hs,i1βi1hi1,i2 ...hiL´1,iLβiLhiL,t (5)
For all the paths between the jth relay of the lth layer to the destination t with path delay L´ l ` 1:
hlj,t “
ÿ
pi1,...,iL´lqPKlj
βljhlj,i1 ...βiL´lhiL´l,t (6)
In terms of these modified channel gains, the source-destination channel in (4) can be written as:
yt “ hstxs `
Lÿ
l“1
nlÿ
j“1
hlj,tzlj ` zt, (7)
Similarly, assuming that the eavesdropper is overhearing the transmissions of the relays in the layer E, 1 ď E ď L, the
input-output channel between the source and the eavesdropper can be written as
ye “ hsexs `
Eÿ
l“1
nlÿ
j“1
hlj,ezlj ` zt, (8)
The secrecy rate at the destination for such a network model can be written as [1], RspPsq “ rIpxs; ytq´Ipxs; yeqs`, where
Ipxs; yq represents the mutual information between random variable xs and y and rus` “ maxtu, 0u.
The secrecy capacity is attained for the Gaussian channels with the Gaussian input xs „ N p0, Psq, where Erx2ss “ Ps, [2].
Therefore, for a given network-wide scaling vector β “ pβliq1ďlďL,1ďiďnl , the optimal secure ANC rate for the channels in
(7) and (8) can be written as the following optimization problem.
RspPsq “ max
β
rRtpPs,βq ´RepPs,βqs (9a)
“ max
β
„
1
2
log
1` SNRtpPs,βq
1` SNRepPs,βq

, (9b)
where SNRtpPs,βq, the signal-to-noise ratio at the destination t is:
SNRtpPs,βq “ Ps
σ2
h2st
1`řLl“1řnlj“1 h2lj,t (10)
and similarly, SNRepPs,βq is
SNRepPs,βq “ Ps
σ2
h2se
1`řEl“1řnlj“1 h2lj,e (11)
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Fig. 2: A symmetric N relay diamond network with an eavesdropper.
Given the monotonicity of the logp¨q function, we have
βopt “ argmax
β
rRtpPs,βq ´RepPs,βqs
“ argmax
β
1` SNRtpPs,βq
1` SNRepPs,βq (12)
III. THE OPTIMAL SECURE ANC RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the optimal secure ANC rate problem in (9) or (12) first for diamond networks and then for
ECGAL networks.
A. Symmetric Diamond Networks
Consider a symmetric diamond with N relay nodes arranged in a layer between the source and the destination as shown in
Figure 2. Using (10) and (11), the SNRt and SNRe in this case are:
SNRt “ Psh
2
s
σ2
přNi“1 βiq2h2t
1`
´řN
i“1 β2i
¯
h2t
and SNRe “ Psh
2
s
σ2
přNi“1 βiq2h2e
1`
´řN
i“1 β2i
¯
h2e
Lemma 1: For symmetric diamond network, βopt in (12) is:
β1,opt, ¨ ¨ ¨ , βN,opt “ βopt “
#
minpβ2max, β2glbq, if ht ą he,
0, otherwise
where
β2glb “
gffe 1
N2h2th
2
e
´
1`N Psh2sσ2
¯
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I.
Here, it is assumed that the eavesdropper chooses to snoop on all the nodes of the layer which is an optimal strategy in
the symmetric layered networks for the eavesdropper as we prove later. However, in general this may not be the case. The
eavesdropper can choose to snoop on fewer nodes and still get higher rate compared to the case when it snoops on all the
nodes of a layer as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1: Consider the relay network shown in Figure 3. Let hs “ 0.6, ht “ 0.3, h1e “ 0.2, h2e “ 0.6, h3e “ 0.4. Let
Ps “ P1 “ P2 “ P3 “ 5 and noise variance σ2 “ 1.0 at each node.
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Fig. 3: 3 relay diamond network with eavesdropper overhearing the transmissions of all the relay nodes.
Case 1: Eavesdropper chooses to snoop on all the relay nodes.
In this case we have the following secrecy rate maximization problem:
Rs “ max
β1,β2,β3
#
1
2
log 1˜`
Psh
2
s
σ2
pβ1`β2`β3q2 h2t
1`pβ21`β22`β23qh2t
¸
´ 1
2
log
˜
1`
Psh
2
s
σ2
pβ1h1e`β2h2e`β3h3eq2
1`β21h21e`β22h22e`β23h23e
¸+
“ max
β1,β2,β3
#
1
2
log
˜
1` 0.162 pβ1`β2`β3q
2
1`pβ21`β22`β23q 0.09
¸
´ 1
2
log
˜
1` 1.8 p0.2β1`0.6β2`0.4β3q
2
1`0.04β21`0.36β22`0.16β23
¸+
The optimal solution of this problem is β1 “ β1,max “ 1.3363, β2 “ 0.0, β3 “ 0.0. For these optimum values of β’s, the
rate achievable at the eavesdropper is:
Re “ 1
2
log
˜
1` 1.8 p0.2β1 ` 0.6β2 ` 0.4β3q
2
1` 0.04β21 ` 0.36β22 ` 0.16β23
¸
“ 0.081749 bits/s/Hz
Case 2: Eavesdropper chooses to snoop on relay nodes 2 and 3.
In this case we have the following secrecy rate maximization problem:
Rs “ max
β1,β2,β3
#
1
2
log
˜
1` Psh
2
s
σ2
pβ1 ` β2 ` β3q2 h2t
1` pβ21 ` β22 ` β23qh2t
¸
´ 1
2
log
˜
1` Psh
2
s
σ2
pβ2h2e ` β3h3eq2
1` β22h22e ` β23h23e
¸+
“ max
β1,β2,β3
#
1
2
log
˜
1` 0.162 pβ1 ` β2 ` β3q
2
1` pβ21 ` β22 ` β23q 0.09
¸
´ 1
2
log
˜
1` 1.8 p0.6β2 ` 0.4β3q
2
1` 0.36β22 ` 0.16β23
¸+
The optimal solution of this problem is β1 “ β1,max “ 1.3363, β2 “ 0.0, β3 “ 0.7298. For these optimum values of β’s, the
rate achievable at the eavesdropper is:
Re “ 1
2
log
˜
1` 1.8 p0.6β2 ` 0.4β3q
2
1` 0.36β22 ` 0.16β23
¸
“ 0.095368 bits/s/Hz
From above it is clear that in the asymmetric diamond networks, the eavesdropper achieves a higher rate when it chooses to
snoop on two nodes (2 and 3) compared to the case where eavesdropper snoops on all the three nodes.
Although, for general layered networks it is very difficult to find which subset of relay nodes the eavesdropper chooses
to snoop on so as to maximize its rate; for symmetric networks it can be easily verified that the rate at the eavesdropper is
maximized when it snoops on all the nodes of a layer. For instance, consider the scenario where all the nodes transmitting
at maximum power is optimum with respect to secrecy rate maximization. The SNR at the eavesdropper when it chooses to
snoop on k nodes is given as
SNRke “ Psh
2
s
σ2
k2β2maxh
2
e
1` kβ2maxh2e (13)
Fig. 4: Achievable rate at the eavesdropper when it snoops on different number of nodes of a symmetric diamond network of
three relay nodes with P “ 10.0, σ2 “ 1.0, hs “ 0.278, ht “ 0.379, he “ 0.073.
Similarly, SNR at the eavesdropper when it chooses to snoop on k ` 1 nodes is
SNRk`1e “ Psh
2
s
σ2
pk ` 1q2β2maxh2e
1` pk ` 1qβ2maxh2e (14)
Clearly,
SNRk`1e ´ SNRke “ Psh
2
s
σ2
β2h2e
`
β2h2ek
2 ` β2h2ek ` 2k ` 1
˘
pβ2h2ek ` 1q pβ2h2ek ` β2h2e ` 1q ě 0,
i.e., SNRk`1e ě SNRke . Thus, for such scenarios eavesdropper achieves a higher rate when it chooses to snoop on more
number of nodes and eventually it will snoop on maximum possible number of nodes to maximize its rate.
Figure 4 shows the rates achievable at the eavesdropper pRe,iq when it chooses to snoop on i, i P t1, 2, 3u number of nodes
of a 3 relay symmetric diamond network of the specified parameters with all the nodes transmitting at their corresponding
optimum values so as to maximize the secrecy rate in each case. Here, again it can be seen that rate at the eavesdropper is
increases when it snoops on all the nodes.
B. ECGAL Layered Networks
In this subsection, we consider the optimal secure ANC rate problem in (9) for ECGAL networks where the source
communicates with the destination via L intermediate relay layers with all channel gains between two adjacent layers being
equal. For the sake of ease of representation, let there be N relays in each layer. The eavesdropper overhears the transmission
from the nodes in relay layer M, 1 ďM ď L. An instance of such a network is given in Figure 1.
Using (10) and (11), the SNRt and SNRe in this case are:
SNRt “ Ps
σ2
h2sH
2
1,M´1
´řN
n“1 βM,n
¯2
h2MH
2
M`1,L„´řM´1
i“1 G2i,M´1
¯´řN
n“1 βM,n
¯2
h2M `
´řN
n“1 β2M,n
¯
h2M

H2M`1,L `
řL
i“M`1G2i,L ` 1
SNRe “ Ps
σ2
h2sH
2
1,M´1
´řN
n“1 βM,n
¯2
h2e´řM´1
i“1 G2i,M´1
¯´řN
n“1 βM,n
¯2
h2e `
´řN
n“1 β2M,n
¯
h2e ` 1
where
H2i,j “
jź
k“i
˜
Nÿ
n“1
βk,n
¸2
h2k
G2i,j “
˜
Nÿ
n“1
β2i,n
¸
h2i
jź
k“i`1
˜
Nÿ
n“1
βk,n
¸2
h2k
Lemma 2: For the ECGAL layered networks, βopt in (12) is:
βopt “ pβ1,opt, . . . ,βM,opt,βM`1,max, . . . ,βL,maxq
Proof: Please refer to Appendix II.
Introduce the following parameters
E “ h2sH21,M´1
F “
M´1ÿ
i“1
G2i,M´1
α “
Lź
i“M`1
˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi,n
¸2
h2i
λ “
Lÿ
i“M`1
λi
˜
Nÿ
n“1
Pi`1,n
¸
Lź
j“i`2
˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi,n
¸2
h2j
µ “
Lź
i“M`1
˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi,n
¸2
h2i `
Lÿ
i“M`1
µi
˜
Nÿ
n“1
Pi`1,n
¸
Lź
j“i`2
˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi,n
¸2
h2j
“ α`
Lÿ
i“M`1
µi
˜
Nÿ
n“1
Pi`1,n
¸
Lź
j“i`2
˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi,n
¸2
h2j
ν “
Lÿ
i“M
νi
˜
Nÿ
n“1
Pi`1,n
¸
Lź
j“i`2
˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi,n
¸2
h2j , νM “ 1,
where
λM`1 “ PspsM`1 ` σ2nM`1q, sM`1 “ 1, nM`1 “ 0
λi “ Ps
»–si´1
¨˝˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi´1,n
¸2
h2i´1` σ2‚˛` σ2ni´1
˜˜
Nÿ
n“1
Pi´1,n
¸
h2i´1` σ2
¸fifl , i P tM ` 2, . . . , Lu
µM`1 “ σ2psM`1 ` σ2nM`1q, sM`1 “ 1, nM`1 “ 0
µi “ σ2
»–si´1
¨˝˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi´1,n
¸2
h2i´1` σ2‚˛` σ2ni´1
˜˜
Nÿ
n“1
Pi´1,n
¸
h2i´1` σ2
¸fifl , i P tM ` 2, . . . , Lu
νM`1 “ psM`1 ` σ2nM`1q, sM`1 “ 0, nM`1 “ 1
νi “ σ2
»–si´1
¨˝˜
Nÿ
n“1
a
Pi´1,n
¸2
h2i´1` σ2‚˛` σ2ni´1
˜˜
Nÿ
n“1
Pi´1,n
¸
h2i´1` σ2
¸fifl , i P tM ` 2, . . . , Lu
Using the preceding lemma and the above parameters, the problem
βopt “ argmax
β
1` SNRt
1` SNRe
is reduced to the following subproblem
pβ1,opt, . . . ,βM,optq “ argmax
pβ1,...,βM q
1` SNRt|βM`1:L,max
1` SNRe , (15)
where for a given network-wide vector of scaling factors pβ1, . . . ,βM ,βM`1,max, . . . ,βL,maxq, the received SNRs at the
destination and the eavesdropper are, respectively
SNRt|βM`1:L,max “ Psσ2
A
´řN
n“1 βM,n
¯2
h2M
B
´řN
n“1 βM,n
¯2
h2M ` C
´řN
n“1 β2M,n
¯
h2M `D
SNRe “ Ps
σ2
E
´řN
n“1 βM,n
¯2
h2e
F
´řN
n“1 βM,n
¯2
h2M `
´řN
n“1 β2M,n
¯
h2M ` 1
with
A “ αE
B “ λE ` µF
C “ µ
D “ ν
Lemma 3: For ECGAL layered networks, the subvector pβM,1,opt, . . . , βM,N,optq of the optimum scaling vectors for the
nodes in the M th layers for given sub-vector pβ1, . . . ,βM´1q is:
β2M,1,opt “ . . . “ β2M,N,opt “ β2M,opt “
#
minpβ2M,max, β2M,glbq, if ph2M α´ h2e νq ą 0,
0, otherwise
where
β2M,glb “ |B|2 |A|
˜c
1` 4 |A| CB2 ´ 1
¸
with
A “ 4h2M h2e
"
h2e αν p2F ` 1q
ˆ
2F ` 1` 2 Ps
σ2
E
˙
´ h2M r2λE ` p2F ` 1qµs
„
p2F ` 1qµ` 2
ˆ
λ` α Ps
σ2
˙
E
*
B “ 4h2M h2e ν rpα´ µq p2F ` 1q ´ 2λEs
C “ ν ph2M α´ h2e νq
Proof: Please refer to Appendix III.
Lemma 4: For ECGAL layered networks,
pβ1,opt, . . . ,βM´1,optq “ pβ1,max, . . . ,βM´1,maxq,
where
β21,n,max “ P1,nPsh2s ` σ2 , n P t1, . . . , Nu
β2i,n,max “ Pi,nPRx,i , i P t2, . . . ,M ´ 1u, n P t1, . . . , Nu
with
PRx,i “ Psh2sH21,i´1 `
«
i´1ÿ
j“1
G2j,i´1 ` 1
ff
σ2
Proof: Please refer to Appendix IV.
In short, Lemma 2-4 together establish that for the ECGAL layered networks with L relays, the optimal vector of the scaling
factors that maximizes the secure ANC rate is βopt “ pβ1,max, . . . ,βM,opt,βM`1,max, . . . ,βL,maxq, where βM,opt is given
by Lemma 3.
IV. HIGH-SNR ANALYSIS OF ACHIEVABLE ANC SECRECY RATE IN ECGAL NETWORKS
We define a wireless layered network to be in high SNR regime if
min
iPt1,...,Lu
SNRi ě 1
δ
for some small δ ě 0. Here, SNRi is the signal-to-noise ratio at the input of any of the relay nodes in the ith layer.
Assume that each relay node in layer i uses the amplification factor
β2i “ Pp1` δqPRi,max , i P t1, . . . , Lu,
where PRi,max is the maximum received signal power at any relay node in the i
th layer which in this case is equal to
N2Ph2i´1 as each relay node receives the transmissions from N relay nodes in the previous layer with maximum transmit
power constrained by P . It should be noted that βi is such that the maximum power constraint (2) is satisfied at each node as
β2i,max “ PPRi ` Pzi ` σ2 “
P´
1` 1SNRi
¯
PRi
ě Pp1` δqPRi,max rSince 1{SNRi ď δ, PRi ď PRi,maxs
Here, PRi and Pzi are the received signal and noise powers at the input of the node i, respectively. Note that as δ Ñ 0, β2i Ñ
β2i,max.
We now analyze the secrecy rate achievable with these scaling factors. However, before discussing the achievable secrecy
rate, we discuss an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of such a network. For the source-destination(eavesdropper) path,
an upper bound on the capacity is given by the capacity of the Gaussian multiple-access channel between the relays in the
Lth layer and the destination (the eavesdropper). This results in the following upper bound on the secrecy capacity of such
networks:
Ccut “ 1
2
log
„
1` Pt{σ2
1` Pe{σ2

,
where Pt “ N2PLh2t and Pe “ N2PLh2e.
The power of the source signal reaching the destination t is:
Ps,t “ Psh2s
˜
L´1ź
i“1
N2β2i h
2
i
¸
N2β2Lh
2
t “ N
2PLh
2
t
p1` δqL (16)
The total power of noise reaching the destination t from all relay nodes:
Pz,t “
Lÿ
i“1
P iz,t “ σ2
˜
L´1ÿ
i“1
Nβ2i h
2
i
˜
L´1ź
j“i`1
pNβjhjq2
¸
N2β2Lh
2
t `Nβ2Lh2t
¸
(17)
where P iz,t is the noise power reaching the destination form nodes in i
th layer.
Now,
P 1z,t “ σ2Nβ21h21
˜
L´1ź
j“2
N2β2jh
2
j
¸
N2β2Lh
2
t “ σ
2
Psh2s
NPh2t
p1` δqL ď
δ
p1` δqLNPh
2
t
P 2z,t “ σ2Nβ22h21
˜
L´1ź
j“3
N2β2jh
2
j
¸
N2β2Lh
2
t “ σ
2
N2Ph21
NPh2t
p1` δqL´1 ď
δ
p1` δqL´1NPh
2
t
...
P iz,t “ σ2Nβ2i h2i
˜
L´1ź
j“i`1
N2β2jh
2
j
¸
N2β2Lh
2
t “ σ
2
N2Ph2i´1
NPh2t
p1` δqL´i`1 ď
δ
p1` δqL´1NPh
2
t
...
PLz,t “ σ2Nβ2Lh2t “ σ
2
N2Ph2L´1
NPh2t
p1` δq ď
δ
p1` δqNPh
2
t
Therefore,
Pz,t “
Lÿ
i“1
P iz,t ď
Lÿ
i“1
δ
p1` δqL´i`1NPh2t
or
Pz,t ď NPh2t
„
1´ 1p1` δqL

(18)
The results in (16) and (17) imply that we have the following for the achievable rate at the destination
Rt “ 1
2
log
„
1` 1p1` δqL
N2PLh
2
t
Pz,t ` σ2

Similarly, the source and noise power reaching the eavesdropper e respectively are:
Ps,e “ Psh2s
˜
L´1ź
i“1
N2β2i h
2
i
¸
N2β2Lh
2
e “ N
2PLh
2
e
p1` δqL
Pz,e “
Lÿ
i“1
P iz,t “
L´1ÿ
i“1
Nβ2i h
2
i
˜
L´1ź
j“i`1
pNβjhjq2
¸
N2β2Lh
2
e `Nβ2Lh2e “ Pz,t h2e{h2t
and the achievable rate at the eavesdropper is:
Re “ 1
2
log
„
1` 1p1` δqL
N2PLh
2
e
Pz,th2e{h2t ` σ2

Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate is
Rs “ Rt ´Re “ 1
2
log
»– 1` 1p1`δqL N2PLh2tPz,t`σ2
1` 1p1`δqL N
2PLh2e
Pz,th2e{h2t`σ2
fifl (19)
Thus, we have the following for the gap between the cutset upper-bound and the achievable secrecy rate
Ccut ´Rs “ 1
2
log
„
1` Pt{σ2
1` Pe{σ2

´ 1
2
log
»– 1` 1p1`δqL N2PLh2tPz,t`σ2
1` 1p1`δqL N
2PLh2e
Pz,th2e{h2t`σ2
fifl (20)
Here, R.H.S. is an increasing function of Pz,t. Thus, from (18) and (20), we have
Ccut ´Rs ď 1
2
log
»–
´
1`
´
1´ 1p1`δqL
¯
NPh2t
σ2
¯´
1` N2Ph2tσ2
¯´
1`
´
1´ 1p1`δqL
¯
NPh2e
σ2 ` N
2Ph2ep1`δqLσ2
¯
´
1`
´
1´ 1p1`δqL
¯
NPh2e
σ2
¯´
1` N2Ph2eσ2
¯´
1`
´
1´ 1p1`δqL
¯
NPh2t
σ2 ` N
2Ph2tp1`δqLσ2
¯
fifl
ď 1
2
log
»–
´
1` LδNPh2tσ2
¯´
1` N2Ph2tσ2
¯´
1` LδNPh2eσ2 ` p1´ LδqN
2Ph2e
σ2
¯
´
1` LδNPh2eσ2
¯´
1` N2Ph2eσ2
¯´
1` LδNPh2tσ2 ` p1´ LδqN
2Ph2t
σ2
¯
fifl “as 1{p1` δqL ě 1´ Lδ‰
“ 1
2
log
»– 1`N2Ph2t {σ2
1` p1´LδqNPh2t {σ2
1`LδPh2t {σ2
O
1`N2Ph2e{σ2
1` p1´LδqNPh2e{σ21`LδPh2e{σ2
fifl
ď 1
2
log
„ˆ
1` LδNPh2t {σ2
p1´ Lδq
˙N ˆ
1` LδNPh
2
e
σ2
˙
“ 1
2
log
„
1
p1´ Lδq
1` LδNPh2t {σ2
1` LδNPh2e{σ2

(21)
Since, Rs,opt ě Rs, Ccut ´ Rs,opt ď Ccut ´ Rs. Note that as δ Ñ 0, Ccut ´ Rs Ñ 0, i.e., secrecy rate approaches the
cut-set bound.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed high SNR approximation scheme.
We consider a 2-layer network with two nodes in each layer and eavesdropper snooping on the transmissions of the nodes in
the last layer. In Figure 5, we plot the achievable secrecy rate when all the nodes transmit at their maximum power along with
the corresponding cut-set as a function of source power for the specified system parameters.
From the figure, it can be observed that at high SNR the achievable rate lies within a constant gap from the cut-set bound.
In Figure 5a, the actual gap between the cut-set bound and achievable rate is 0.05 bits/sec/Hz while the upper bound on this
gap as given by (21) is 0.25 bits/sec/Hz. Similarly, in Figure 5b, the actual gap is 0.03 bits/sec/Hz while the upper bound on
this gap is 0.09 bits/sec/Hz. Thus, it can be seen that (21) tightly approximates the gap between achievable secrecy rate and
the cut-set bound.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: Plot of achievable secrecy rate with all relays transmitting at maximum power against varying source power along with
the cutset bound for 2-layer network with 2 nodes in each layer. P “ 500, σ2 “ 1.0, δ “ 0.005, (a) hs “ 0.689, h1 “
0.603, ht “ 0.203, he “ 0.031, and (b) hs “ 0.260, h1 “ 0.925, ht “ 0.113, he “ 0.012.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We consider the problem of secure ANC rate maximization over a class of Gaussian layered networks where a source
communicates with a destination through L intermediate relay layers with N nodes in each layer in the presence of a single
eavesdropper which can overhear the transmissions of the nodes in any one layer. The key contribution of is the computation
of the globally optimal set of scaling factors for the nodes that maximizes the end-to-end secrecy rate for a class of layered
networks. We also show that in the high-SNR regime, ANC achieves secrecy rates within a constant gap of the cutset upper
bound on the secrecy capacity and numerically validate this. In future, we plan to extend this work for more general layered
networks.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
To find the value of βopt that maximizes the corresponding secrecy rate, equating the partial derivative of the secrecy rate
in (15) with respect to βi to zero, we get a system of N simultaneous polynomial equations. Without any loss of generality,
subtracting the equation corresponding to the partial derivative with respect to β1 from the rest of N ´ 1 equations, it is easy
to prove that β1 “ β2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ βN “ β is the only root of this system of equations. Substituting this solution in one of the
equations, we get
β
`
N2h2th
2
epNPsh2s ` σ2qβ4 ´ σ2
˘ “ 0
This equation has the following two distinct and real solutions for the stationary points of the secrecy rate with respect to β:
βz “ 0, and β2glb “
gffe 1
N2h2th
2
e
´
1`N Psh2sσ2
¯
Now using the second derivative test, we can prove that when ht ą he, then βz and βglb are the points of global minimum
and maximum, respectively. Similarly, for he ą ht, βz and βglb can be proved to be the points of global maximum and
minimum, respectively. Given the convex nature of the secrecy rate function with respect to β for ht ą he and that βmax is
the largest value of the scaling factor β, we have the result
β2opt “ minpβ2max, β2glbq, if ht ą he
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
From (12), we have
βopt “ argmax
β
1` SNRt
1` SNRe
“ argmax
pβ1,...,βM q
argmax
pβM`1,...,βLq
1` SNRt
1` SNRe
where the last step follows from SNRe being only a function of pβ1, . . . , βM q.
Using [18, Lemma 2], it is straightforward to establish that
pβM`1,max, . . . ,βL,maxq “ argmax
pβM`1,...,βLq
1` SNRt,
where we have
β2M`1,n,max “ PM`1,nPRx,M`1 , n P t1, . . . , Nu
β2i,n,max “ Pi,nPRx,i , i P tM ` 2, . . . , Lu, n P t1, . . . , Nu,
where
PRx,M`1 “ h2sH21,M´1Ps
˜
Nÿ
n“1
βM,n
¸2
h2M `
»–˜M´1ÿ
i“1
G2i,M´1
¸˜
Nÿ
n“1
βM,n
¸2
h2M `
˜
Nÿ
n“1
β2M,n
¸
h2M
fiflσ2 ` σ2
“ SM`1Ps ` pN1:M ` 1qσ2
PRx,i “ SM`1PsH2M`1,i `N1:M`1H2M`1,i ` σ2
«
i´1ÿ
j“M`1
G2j,i´1 ` 1
ff
Note that as in the ECGAL networks, all channels gains between two adjacent layers are equal, the received power at all
relays in a layer is the same.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
To find the value of βM,opt that maximizes the corresponding secrecy rate, equating the partial derivative of the secrecy rate
in (15) with respect to βM,n to zero, we get a system of N simultaneous polynomial equations. Without any loss of generality,
subtracting the equation corresponding to the partial derivative with respect to βM,1 from the rest of N ´ 1 equations, it is
easy to prove that βM,1 “ βM,2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ βM,N “ βM is one of the roots of this system of equations. Substituting this solution
in one of the equations, we get
βM
`Aβ4M ´ |B|β2M ` C˘ “ 0
This equation has the following three distinct and real solutions for the stationary points of the secrecy rate with respect to
βM : βM,z “ 0 and
β2M “
$’’&’’%
|B|
2 |A|
ˆb
1` 4 |A| CB2 ´ 1
˙
,A ă 0, C ą 0
|B|
2A
ˆb
1` 4A |C|B2 ` 1
˙
,A ą 0, C ă 0
Before discussing the nature of these stationary points, note that
h2Mα´h2eνą0 ùñ h2eανp2F`1q 2ˆF`1`2
Ps
σ2
E
˙
´h2M r2λE`p2F`1qµs
„
p2F`1qµ`2 λˆ`αPs
σ2
˙
E

ă0
h2eανp2F`1q 2ˆF`1`2Psσ2E
˙
´h2M r2λE`p2F`1qµs
„
p2F`1qµ`2 λˆ`αPs
σ2
˙
E

ą0 ùñ h2Mα´h2eνă0
Now using the second derivative test, we can prove that when h2M α´h2e ν ą 0, then βM,z and βM,1 are the points of global
minimum and maximum, respectively. Similarly, for h2eανp2F`1q
`
2F ` 1` 2Psσ2E
˘´h2M r2λE`p2F`1qµs “p2F ` 1qµ` 2 `λ` αPsσ2 ˘E‰ ą
0, βM,z and βM,2 can be proved to be the points of global maximum and minimum, respectively. To emphasize that βM,1 is
the point of global maximum of the secrecy rate, we rechristen it βM,glb. Given the convex nature of the secrecy rate function
with respect to βM for h2M α´ h2e ν ą 0 and that βM,max is the largest value of the scaling factor βM , we have the result
β2M,opt “ minpβ2M,max, β2M,glbq, if h2M α´ h2e ν ą 0
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
With optimum values of the scaling factors for the nodes in layers pM,M ` 1, . . . , Lq from Lemmas 2 and 3, the problem
(12) of computing the optimal network-wide scaling vector reduces to
βopt “ argmax
pβ1,...,βM´1,βM,opt,...,βN,maxq
1` SNRt
1` SNRe
Similar to [23, lemma 3] for linear chain networks, we can show that 1`SNRt1`SNRe is a quasi-convex function of βM´1 in the
interval r´βM´1,max,βM´1,maxs for a given sub-vector pβ1, . . . ,βM´2q of scaling factors of first M ´ 2 relay layers and
optimum sub-vector pβM,opt, . . . , βL,optq “ pβM,opt, . . . , βL,maxq of the optimum scaling factors of the remaining relays. Thus,
βM´1,opt “ βM´1,max. Carrying out this process successively for relays in layer M ´ 2, . . . , 1, proves the lemma.
